WHERE BORDERS BLEED: AN INSIDER'S ACCOUNT OF INDO-PAK RELATIONS by Rajiv Dogra

Author:Rajiv Dogra [Dogra, Rajiv]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Publisher: Rupa Publications
Published: 2014-12-31T18:30:00+00:00

Both had reason to do a good turn to Pakistan; at least they felt that they owed it a big favour each. Pakistan’s good offices had brought China out of international isolation and set it on a road where, with American and Western help, it was to achieve industrial and economic greatness. Out of that gratefulness, and for other strategic reasons, China reached out and aided Pakistan in numerous ways to help it in its nuclear quest and to aid its defence sector. But it was the US which overwhelmed Pakistan with financial and armaments help.

Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger have both been credited with great wisdom and immense diplomatic acumen. One event which has added to this perception is the pas de deux with China. The stealth with which it was conducted added a sense of drama to the entire exercise, and the selective media leaks inspired a degree of anticipation about what, when and how the next step might follow.

Nixon may have felt the need to reach out to China as a part of his grand design to counter the Soviet Union. But did it really help achieve his objective? Was the Soviet Union subdued as a result? Did this US–China rapprochement lead in any remarkable way to the break-up of the Soviet Union? Did China contribute significantly in this East–West struggle? None of the answers to these questions is reassuring.

On the other hand, the American initiative allowed the Chinese genie to come out of its isolation. The earlier suspicion of the world about China was henceforth to be replaced by fascination. Every inane uttering of Mao was anointed as the words of an oracle, laced with deep philosophical meaning.

Looking at the record of a perfunctory audience granted by Mao to Nixon and Kissinger (February 1972), one can’t help wondering if it really was a meeting of equals. Nixon comes across as an awed, eager visitor who is keen to discuss international affairs with the master. But Mao fended off Nixon’s requests and kept his interaction at a so-called philosophical level to show that his status was higher than that of the president of the United States who had taken the initiative to travel to Beijing.

It was Prime Minister Chou En-lai who engaged the visitors and talked to Nixon about matters of the world. In their meetings too, it was Chou En-lai who largely determined the pace and direction of their talks.

Nixon stooped willingly to allow himself to be conquered by the Chinese leadership. Even the otherwise status-conscious Kissinger went to Paris to meet the Chinese ambassador there on over two dozen separate occasions. That pandering, and the large-scale investment in China by the West, has elevated it to a near-equal status economically and technologically with the US. It now aims to compete with the US in the strategic sphere. Yet, the US continues to regard the truncated Russia as a greater security threat to its global interests.

Kissinger’s report to Nixon of his preparatory two-day visit to China in July 1971 was adulatory.

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